Philosophy of mind

被引：0
作者：
Rey, Georges [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Maryland, Dept Philosophy, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
来源：
WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS-COGNITIVE SCIENCE | 2010年 / 1卷 / 05期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1002/wcs.32
中图分类号：
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号：
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要：
Philosophy of mind concerns questions about mental phenomena that empirical research alone can't settle, such as the nature of mental states and which sorts of things can have them-only living things, or also machines? Settling them requires reflection on such phenomena as consciousness, rationality, and intentionality; the 'explanatory gaps' that seem to exist between these; and underlying physical phenomena and the different strategies-dualist, eliminativist, physicalist, and functionalist-that have been proposed for dealing with them. (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cogn Sci 2010 1 648-657
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页码：648 / 657
页数：10
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