Since the 1970s democratic citizenship has been an explicit goal of the Icelandic educational system and also a topic of teaching and research for Sigrun Adalbjarnardottir. In a recent publication by the Council of Europe titled Competences for Democratic Culture: Living Together as Equals in Culturally Diverse Democratic Societies, a model for connpetences for democratic culture is presented. This can be seen as an attempt to describe the competences necessary for democratic citizenship. In the present paper I critically examine this model and present an alternative conception of democratic connpetences which I compare to some of the central ideas found in the research of Sigrun Aoalbjarnardattir. My criticism of the publication of the Council of Europe is twofold. On the one hand, I criticise its lack of an explicit grounding of the model of democratic competences in a theory.of democracy. This leads to the situation where a model of democratic competences is presented without much discussion of what makes these connpetences specifically democratic. On the other hand, I criticise the very notion of competence used in the publication. In the Council of Europe model, 20 core connpetences are presented, each of which falls into one of four categories: (i) a value, (ii) an attitude, (iii) a skill or (iv) knowledge and understanding. The alternative notion presented here defines a democratic competence as a complex construct composed of elements from each of these four categories. I define seven such complex competences: Discursive competence, Competence for conflict resolution, Competence for critical re-evaluation, Competence for communal living, Competence for resilience, Competence for forming a conception of a good life, Competence for respecting the natural boundaries of human living. In developing my own conception of democratic connpetences, I consider three kinds of conditions that make democracy necessary for a just society: a political condition, a moral condition, and a condition for individualization. I then consider three broad ideas of democracy which all respond very differently to these three kinds of conditions: liberal democracy, deliberative democracy and Deweyan democracy. The liberal conception of democracy views democracy as a forum for free competition of ideas but has little to offer in the way of democratic education. Democratic connpetences, according to this view, concern the ability to advocate and advance one's own interests while also tolerating differences. The deliberative conception fares much better as it gives special attention to deliberation or discussion and mutual understanding. But the deliberative conception has shortcomings of its own. One problem for the deliberative conception is its starting point in structural issues concerning the way in which equal citizens might justly take collective binding decisions. In a school setting, the "demos" is not a group of equals but a group of individuals unequal in important ways and such collective binding decisions are not central to educational work. The third view, a Deweyan conception, offers an account of democracy much more closely connected to learning and individual virtues or connpetences than the other two and, therefore, much richer as a ground for defining democratic competences. The seven complex democratic connpetences I define derive naturally from a conception of democracy similar to the one presented by John Dewey over a century ago while, at the same time, being more practical as a guiding ideal for democratic education. These competences also reflect concerns which have been central in the research of Sigrun Malbjarnardattir on democratic citizenship as grounded in the social, moral and emotional maturity of youth. Finally, I consider whether, by developing my conception of democratic connpetences, I have stretched the concept of democracy too wide.
