How Does a Retailer's Service Plan Affect a Manufacturer's Warranty?

被引:103
作者
Jiang, Bo [1 ]
Zhang, Xubing [2 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Fac Business Adm, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Fac Business, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
service plans; warranty; signaling; distribution channels; game theory; SIGNALS;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1110.1308
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
A service plan is a type of optional warranty beyond manufacturers' base warranties that retailers offer to consumers. In this paper, we examine how a service plan affects the role played by a manufacturer's base warranty. Analysis shows that when consumers can assess product quality (i.e., the probability of product failure), the manufacturer's warranty is negatively affected by the presence of a service plan. In the presence of such a plan, a base warranty is offered only when the manufacturer is very cost-efficient in providing a warranty relative to the retailer. In this case, although the double-marginalization problem is aggravated, offering a (limited) base warranty reduces the total warranty cost in the channel and provokes the retailer into enlarging the service plan coverage. When consumers cannot assess product quality, a high-quality manufacturer is motivated to offer a base warranty to signal its quality. In the presence of a service plan, however, a very cost-efficient manufacturer is discouraged from doing so.
引用
收藏
页码:727 / 740
页数:14
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