A Randomized Countermeasure Against Parasitic Adversaries in Wireless Sensor Networks

被引:6
作者
Papadimitratos, Panagiotis [1 ]
Luo, Jun [2 ]
Hubaux, Jean-Pierre [1 ]
机构
[1] Ecole Polytech Fed Lausanne, Swiss Fed Inst Technol Lausanne, Sch Comp & Commun Sci, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
[2] Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Comp Engn, Singapore, Singapore
关键词
Confidentiality; Security; Probabilistic Key Refreshing and En-route Encryption; GossiCrypt;
D O I
10.1109/JSAC.2010.100908
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Due to their limited capabilities, wireless sensor nodes are subject to physical attacks that are hard to defend against. In this paper, we first identify a typical attacker, called parasitic adversary, who seeks to exploit sensor networks by obtaining measurements in an unauthorized way. As a countermeasure, we first employ a randomized key refreshing: with low communication cost, it aims at confining (but not eliminating) the effects of the adversary. Moreover, our low-complexity solution, GossiCrypt, leverages on the large scale of sensor networks to protect data confidentiality, efficiently and effectively. GossiCrypt applies symmetric key encryption to data at their source nodes; and it applies re-encryption at a randomly chosen subset of nodes en route to the sink. The combination of randomized key refreshing and GossiCrypt protects data confidentiality with a probability of almost 1; we show this analytically and with simulations. In addition, the energy consumption of GossiCrypt is lower than a public-key based solution by several orders of magnitude.
引用
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页码:1036 / 1045
页数:10
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