How Governments Promote Monopolies: Public Procurement in India

被引:3
作者
Goyal, Yugank [1 ]
机构
[1] OP Jindal Global Univ, Econ, Sonipat, India
关键词
RENT-SEEKING; CORRUPTION; BARRIERS; ENTRY; COMPETITION; GROWTH; ACCESS; POLICY;
D O I
10.1111/ajes.12300
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Government officials exert tremendous power when they buy goods and services from private companies. By setting the terms and conditions under which public procurement takes place, public officials help determine which companies will thrive and which ones will fail. This is one of the important ways governments help create and sustain monopolies in the private sector. But since the bidding process to sell products or services to the government is supposed to be an open and fair competition, how does it become skewed toward businesses that already dominate markets? We examine a particular source of bias: the eligibility criteria for bidding in public procurement tenders. These criteria often allow a few large, private companies to bid on government contracts, but they exclude a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. We study the terms by which offers are solicited in India through tenders floated for transportation projects: roads, highways, bridges, and civil construction. We find that the eligibility criteria impose an unnecessarily heavy burden on small firms, potentially knocking them out of the competition and discouraging them from participating in other procurement processes. In this way, the process reinforces monopolies instead of breaking them up. While this study focuses on India, the results also apply to similar economies.
引用
收藏
页码:1135 / 1169
页数:35
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