The Influence of a Company's Ownership Structure on Upward Real Earnings Management

被引:24
作者
Piosik, Andrzej [1 ]
Genge, Ewa [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Econ Katowice, Dept Accounting, Ul 1 Maja 50, PL-40287 Katowice, Poland
[2] Univ Econ Katowice, Dept Econ & Financial Anal, Ul 1 Maja 50, PL-40287 Katowice, Poland
关键词
real earnings management; a company's ownership structure; ownership concentration; managerial ownership; financial transparency; development; institutional investors; selling; general and administrative expenses; R&D expenses; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION; BONUS SCHEMES; PRIVATE; QUALITY; IMPACT; INFORMATIVENESS; SHAREHOLDERS; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.3390/su12010152
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Financial transparency, including transparency of transactions, is one of the pillars of sustainability. This study investigates whether a company's ownership structure, including ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and the presence of institutional investors, affects upward real earnings management practices. The research is based on companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in Poland adapting panel data regression models. The significance and contribution to literature of the paper lies in the fact that we provide evidence that the association between the magnitude of total upward real earnings management and shareholder concentration is U-shaped, thereby indicating that there is an optimal level of ownership concentration, minimizing the magnitude of upward real earnings management and thus increasing financial transparency. Our results show the negative relationship between total upward real earnings management and managerial ownership, thereby we confirm the alignment of interest hypothesis, in terms of real earnings management. We also confirm that individual instruments of real earnings management are linked to ownership concentration and managerial ownership in specific ways. The presence of institutional investors reduces the magnitude of total upward real earnings management.
引用
收藏
页数:24
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