Virtual power plant auctions

被引：38

作者：

Ausubel, Lawrence M. ^{[1
]}

Cramton, Peter ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Maryland, Dept Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

来源：

UTILITIES POLICY | 2010年 / 18卷 / 04期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Electricity auctions; Market design; Auctions; Clock auctions; Virtual power plants;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jup.2010.05.002

中图分类号：

TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];

学科分类号：

0807 ; 0820 ;

摘要：

Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets. (c) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：201 / 208

页数：8

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[4]

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[7]

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