Modeling Two-Sided Matching Considering Agents' Psychological Behavior Based on Regret Theory

被引:8
作者
Wang, Rong [1 ]
Xu, Li [2 ,3 ]
Zameer, Hashim [3 ]
Solangi, Yasir Ahmed [3 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Inst Technol, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[2] Jiangsu Vocat Inst Commerce, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[3] Nanjing Univ Aeronaut & Astronaut, Nanjing, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
two-sided matching; linguistic preference; regret aversion; minmax method; regret theory; COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; DECISION-MAKING; MARRIAGE; STABILITY; MARKETS; CHOICE; COMMON;
D O I
10.1177/2158244020931899
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Two-sided matching problems are common and crucial parts of human activity; the psychological behavior of agents is an important factor that should not be ignored in such problems. However, existing academic research has not considered the psychological behavior of agents in two-sided matching models. Therefore, this study develops a method for determining the most satisfactory results for agents on both sides of a matching problem that considers agents' regret aversion behavior as measured using linguistic preference information. Initially, the preference utility and regret values are computed based on regret theory; then, the perceived utility values of each agent are obtained. This two-sided matching model has been established to maximize matching satisfaction without waste using the minmax method. Finally, a practical example is discussed to demonstrate the feasibility and validity of the proposed method.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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