Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams

被引：21

作者：

Bornstein, Gary ^{[1
,2
]}

Kugler, Tamar ^{[3
]}

Budescu, David V. ^{[4
]}

Selten, Reinhard ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Psychol, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel

[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Rat & Interact Decis Theory, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel

[3] Univ Arizona, Dept Management & Policy, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

[4] Univ Illinois, Dept Psychol, Champaign, IL 61820 USA

[5] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-5300 Bonn, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2008年 / 66卷 / 3-4期

基金：

以色列科学基金会;

关键词：

Bertrand model; price competition; tacit collusion; experiments; group behavior;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We conducted an experimental study of price competition in a duopolistic market. The market was operationalized as a repeated game between two "teams" with one, two, or three players in each team. We found that asking (and winning) prices were significantly higher in competition between individuals than in competition between two- or three-person teams. There were no general effects of team size, but prices increased with time when each team member was paid his or her own asking price and decreased when the team's profits were divided equally. This result is consistent with a simple model of individual learning. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：808 / 821

页数：14

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