The performance of multi-type environmental credit trading markets: Lab experiment evidence

被引:9
作者
Li, Zhi [1 ,2 ]
Liu, Pengfei [3 ]
Swallow, Stephen K. [4 ]
机构
[1] Xiamen Univ, Sch Econ, Wang Yanan Inst Studies Econ, Dept Publ Finance,MOE Key Lab Econometr, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
[2] Xiamen Univ, Fujian Key Lab Stat, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Rhode Isl, Dept Environm & Nat Resource Econ, 1 Greenhouse Rd, Kingston, RI 02881 USA
[4] Univ Connecticut, Ctr Environm Sci & Engn, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, 1376 Storrs Rd Unit 4021, Storrs, CT 06269 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Multi-type credit trading; Experimental economics; Double auction; Production complementarity; CARBON SEQUESTRATION; CO-BENEFITS; COBENEFITS; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102563
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We experimentally compare the performance of two multi-type environmental credit trading markets. The first trading market is called the multiple market (MM) institution, which allows the providers to sell jointly produced credits of all types. The second trading market is called the single market (SM) institution, where the providers of jointly produced credits can only choose one type of credit to sell. We investigate several key indicators, including the trading price, quantity, and net social benefit, to compare the performance of the SM and MM institutions. We find that the trading prices are significantly lower in MM compared to SM, indicating that MM potentially benefits the credit buyers. We also find that SM leads to more credit productions. Since not all credits can be traded in SM, the increase in the production cost outweighs the increase in the total social benefit. As a result, the net social benefit is lower in SM compared to MM. We expand the literature by firstly designing a market platform for multi-type credit trading and then assessing their performance with lab experiment evidence.
引用
收藏
页数:16
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