A Note on Air-Cargo Capacity Contracts

被引:36
作者
Amaruchkul, Kannapha [1 ]
Cooper, William L. [2 ]
Gupta, Diwakar [2 ]
机构
[1] NIDA, Sch Appl Stat, Bangkok 10240, Thailand
[2] Univ Minnesota, Program Ind & Syst Engn, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
capacity contracts; asymmetric information; informational rents; SUPPLY CONTRACTS; INFORMATION; ALLOCATION; MECHANISMS; DEMANDS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1937-5956.2010.01158.x
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
Carriers (airlines) use medium-term contracts to allot bulk cargo capacity to forwarders who deliver consolidated loads for each flight in the contractual period (season). Carriers also sell capacity to direct-ship customers on each flight. We study capacity contracts between a carrier and a forwarder when certain parameters such as the forwarder's demand, operating cost to the carrier, margin, and reservation profit are its private information. We propose contracts in which the forwarder pays a lump sum in exchange for a guaranteed capacity allotment and receives a refund for each unit of unused capacity according to a pre-announced refund rate. We obtain an upper bound on the informational rent paid by the carrier for a menu of arbitrary allotments and identify conditions under which it can eliminate the informational rent and induce the forwarder to choose the overall optimal capacity allotment (i.e., one that maximizes the combined profits of the carrier and the forwarder).
引用
收藏
页码:152 / 162
页数:11
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