Does Managerial Foreign Experience Deter Corporate Fraud

被引:5
|
作者
Luo, Jia [1 ]
Wang, Li [2 ]
机构
[1] Hunan Normal Univ, Sch Business, Hunan Key Lab Macroecon Big Data Min & Its Applic, Changsha, Peoples R China
[2] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Res Inst Social Sci, Govt Accounting Res Inst, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Managerial foreign experience; corporate fraud; information environment; China; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; BRAIN GAIN; COMPENSATION; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTOR; QUALITY; RIGHTS; CHINA;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2021.1973424
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore how managers with foreign experience affect corporate fraud in China. By employing a bivariate probit model with partial observability, we find that returnee managers significantly reduce the incidence of corporate fraud, and increase the probability of being detected, dependent on the given fraud. Improved corporate information environment may mainly drive our results. Furthermore, the impact of returnee managers on fraud deterrence also varies according to the different nature of foreign managerial experience, positions of returnee managers, and types of corporate frauds. Overall, we offer new evidence that returnee managers have an increased awareness of corporate fraud.
引用
收藏
页码:342 / 364
页数:23
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Corporate fraud
    Lavine, MK
    ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 1999, 74 (02): : 242 - 242
  • [32] Does foreign experience of top management affect corporate environmental responsibility? Evidence from China
    Li, Wanfu
    Jiang, Mengmeng
    Zhang, Xuejiao
    Wang, Yu
    Qu, Xiaoyi
    ECONOMIC MODELLING, 2023, 122
  • [33] Does corporate governance mechanism deter earnings management and enhance readability of annual reports?
    Zheng, Dong
    Ali, Rajib
    Zhao, Feifei
    Shaique, Muhammad
    PLOS ONE, 2025, 20 (02):
  • [34] Does government institutional reform deter corporate tax evasion? Evidence from China
    Xu, Junbing
    Zhu, Minling
    Song, Shengying
    Wu, Yunxi
    PLOS ONE, 2022, 17 (12):
  • [35] Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring
    Robison, H.
    Santore, Rudy
    FINANCIAL REVIEW, 2011, 46 (02) : 281 - 311
  • [36] CEO foreign experience and corporate financial investment
    Liang, Shangkun
    Niu, Yuhao
    Xin, Fu
    Jiang, Lixian
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2024, 93 : 929 - 946
  • [37] Directors with foreign experience and corporate tax avoidance
    Wen, Wen
    Cui, Huijie
    Ke, Yun
    JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2020, 62
  • [38] Reestablishing the legitimacy after fraud: does corporate governance structure matter?
    Rizwan, Sohail
    Chughtai, Sumayya
    SOUTH ASIAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STUDIES, 2023, 12 (04) : 537 - 558
  • [39] Does fintech innovation impact corporate fraud? Evidence from China
    Tang, Mengxuan
    Hu, Yang
    Hou, Yang
    Goodell, John W.
    FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS, 2024, 67
  • [40] RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AS A COMPONENT OF THE MANAGERIAL SYSTEM OF CORPORATE FOREIGN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
    Lukianova, V. V.
    Sviderska, A. V.
    SCIENTIFIC BULLETIN OF POLISSIA, 2015, (03): : 90 - 95