An Empirical Analysis of Post-contractual Behaviour Regarding Public Contracts for Construction Work in the Czech Republic

被引:0
作者
Placek, Michal [1 ]
Ochrana, Frantisek [1 ]
Schmidt, Martin [1 ]
Pucek, Milan [2 ]
机构
[1] Charles Univ Prague, Fac Social Sci, Smetanovo Nabrezi 995-6, Prague, Czech Republic
[2] Coll Reg Dev Prague, Zelanskeho 68-54, Prague, Czech Republic
来源
NEW TRENDS IN FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING | 2017年
关键词
Public procurement; Post-contractual behaviour; Construction work; PROCUREMENT; TRANSPARENCY; CORRUPTION;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-319-49559-0_32
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The article analyses the post-contractual behaviour of actors dealing with public tenders on a sample of 200 randomly selected public works contracts. In this sample, we examined public contracts awarded in 2013, for which it was possible to trace information regarding the final price. Using an econometric model, we have tried to find the factors which have a statistically significant effect on the ratio between the final price paid and the tendered price. The results were compared with similar studies compiled from the conditions in Slovakia. The model shows that the number of offers constitutes a statistically significant indicator of the price. Conversely, factors with negative impact were identified as being the difference between the estimated price and the real tendered price, as well as the use of subcontractors.
引用
收藏
页码:347 / 354
页数:8
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