Finite-key security analysis of the 1-decoy state QKD protocol with a leaky intensity modulator

被引：3

作者：

Wang, Weilong ^{[1
,2
]}

Meng, Xiangdong ^{[1
,2
]}

Fei, Yangyang ^{[1
,2
]}

Ma, Zhi ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] State Key Lab Math Engn & Adv Comp, Zhengzhou 450001, Henan, Peoples R China

[2] Henan Key Lab Network Cryptog Technol, Zhengzhou 450001, Henan, Peoples R China

来源：

QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING | 2020年 / 19卷 / 07期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Quantum key distribution; One-decoy protocol; Information leakage; Intensity modulator; Finite-key security analysis;

D O I：

10.1007/s11128-020-02694-6

中图分类号：

O4 [物理学];

学科分类号：

0702 ;

摘要：

The finite-key security of the standard three-intensity decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in the presence of information leakage has been analyzed (Wang et al. in New J Phys 20:083027, 2018). On the other hand, the 1-decoy state QKD protocol has been proved to be able to achieve higher secret key rate than the three-intensity decoy-state QKD protocol in the finite-key regime by using only two different intensity settings (Davide et al. in Appl Phys Lett 112:171104, 2018). In this work, we analyze the finite-key security of the 1-decoy state QKD protocol with a leaky intensity modulator, which is used to generate the decoy state. In particular, we simulate the secret key rate under three practical cases of Trojan-horse attacks. Our simulation results demonstrate that the 1-decoy state QKD protocol can be secure over long distances within a reasonable time frame given that the intensity modulator is sufficiently isolated. By comparing the simulation results to those presented in Wang et al. (2018), we find that, as expected, the 1-decoy state QKD protocol is more robust against information leakage from the intensity modulator for all achievable distances.

引用

页数：16

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