A game-theoretic model for generation expansion planning: Problem formulation and numerical comparisons

被引:152
作者
Chuang, AS [1 ]
Wu, F [1 ]
Varaiya, P [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
economics; game theory; genetic algorithms; power generation planning; power generation reliability; power industry;
D O I
10.1109/59.962441
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
This paper presents an application of noncooperative game theory to generation expansion planning (GEP) in a competitive electricity industry. We apply the Cournot model of oligopoly behavior to formulate a GEP model that may characterize expansion planning in a competitive regime, particularly in pool-dominated generation supply industries. Numerical experiments are conducted on a test system to analyze generation investment and market participation decisions of candidate expansion units that vary in costs and forced outage rates. The numerical results point to: 1) greater industry expansion and system reliability, under Cournot competition than under centralized expansion planning; and 2) higher probabilistic measures of reliability from multi-player expansion than from expansion by a traditional monopolist with an equivalent reserve margin requirement. Furthermore, we summarize analytical results involving a simplified version of the GEP game.
引用
收藏
页码:885 / 891
页数:7
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