Behind the Political Connections Under Emerging Democracies

被引:4
作者
Ulziisukh, Selenge [1 ]
Wei Zelong [2 ]
机构
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Xian, Peoples R China
[2] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Xian, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
boundary condition; emerging democracies; informal networks; political connection; resource dependence theory; RESOURCE DEPENDENCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; MARKET FIRMS; POWER; STRATEGIES; INSTITUTIONS; EMBEDDEDNESS; GOVERNMENT; DIRECTORS; NETWORKS;
D O I
10.1017/mor.2021.74
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In light of inconclusive findings on the effect of political connections, this study explores conditions that affect the effectiveness of political connections on firm performance in democratic systems. First, using a resource dependence rationale, this study stresses the importance of variation in political connections and classifies direct and indirect political connections based on sources of power and the mechanisms for developing connections. Second, this study recognizes that influencing political outcomes is an entire political process in which political power matters. Furthermore, as power is central to the resource dependence rationale unlike exchange in transaction cost economics, this study explores how the effectiveness of political connections is contingent on the dynamics of de jure political power. We find that the effect of direct political connections is susceptible to changes in de jure political power due to its dyadic relationship with de jure power, while indirect political connections are more robust to such changes due to their connections with informal networks holding de facto political power. Further, the positive effects of political connections on firm performance are mediated by operational capability.
引用
收藏
页码:686 / 716
页数:31
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