Assessment of attack likelihood to support security risk assessment studies for chemical facilities

被引:49
作者
Landucci, Gabriele [1 ]
Argenti, Francesca [2 ]
Cozzani, Valerio [2 ]
Reniers, Genserik [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pisa, Dipartimento Ingn Civile & Ind, Largo Lucio Lazzarino 1, I-56126 Pisa, Italy
[2] Alma Mater Studiorum Univ Bologna, LISES Dipartimento Ingn Civile Chim Ambientale &, Via Terracini 28, I-40131 Bologna, Italy
[3] Delft Univ Technol, Fac Technol Policy & Management, Safety & Secur Sci Grp, Jaffalaan 5, NL-2628 BX Delft, Netherlands
[4] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Fac Econ & Org Sci, Campus Brussels,Warmoesberg 26, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
关键词
Security risk; Likelihood; Physical protection systems; Probabilistic assessment; Bayesian Networks; Major accident hazard; COST-BENEFIT-ANALYSIS; TERRORIST ATTACKS; VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT; PROBABILISTIC RISK; PROCESS INDUSTRIES; BAYESIAN NETWORKS; DECISION-MAKING; MODEL; INFRASTRUCTURE; ATTRACTIVENESS;
D O I
10.1016/j.psep.2017.06.019
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Chemical and process facilities may be the target of external acts of interference, aimed at causing cascading events, which may escalate into severe fires, explosions or toxic dispersions. Recent accidents that occurred in European chemical facilities presented these features, showing that industry must address with the greatest urgency the need of increasing the attention to security issues. Objective, performance-based methods to verify the adequateness of the resources dedicated to the protection of assets against external attacks are needed. In the present study, a probabilistic risk analysis approach supported by a model based on Bayesian Networks is adopted to address the quantitative assessment of the attack likelihood and to incorporate the functional analysis of physical protection systems (PPS) applied the security of process and storage installations. A case study of industrial interest is analysed to exemplify the methodology, which may be adopted to evaluate the PPS in place in a given facility. The methodology also allows for a quantitative evaluation of attack success credibility and for the identification of the more critical escalation scenarios, thus supporting safety and security reviews of chemical and process facilities. (C) 2017 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:102 / 114
页数:13
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