Optimal allocation of defensive resources to defend urban power networks against different types of attackers

被引:8
作者
Han, Lin [1 ]
Zhao, Xudong [1 ]
Chen, Zhilong [1 ]
Wu, Yipeng [1 ]
Su, Xiaochao [2 ]
Zhang, Ning [1 ]
机构
[1] Army Engn Univ PLA, State Key Lab Explos & Impact & Disaster Prevent, Nanjing 210007, Peoples R China
[2] Management Ctr Hennan Civil Air Def Command Post, Zhengzhou 450000, Peoples R China
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Intentional attacks; Power network; Game theory; Defensive resources; Optimal strategy; GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL; RISK-ASSESSMENT; INFRASTRUCTURES; VULNERABILITY; PROTECTION; COMPLEX;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijcip.2021.100467
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
As an important part of urban lifeline networks, the urban power network is threatened by multiple types of intentional attackers, such as criminals, terrorists, illegal employees, etc. Each type of attackers differs remarkably in purposes, strategies and valuations of targets. In order to improve the defense capability of urban power network under the threat of different types of attackers, this study proposed an optimal allocation method of defensive resources based on Bayesian game model to reduce the expected loss of the defender. In the case study of IEEE 30-bus network, the reliability and applicability of the resource optimization allocation method are verified through the comparison of the expected loss under different strategy combinations. It is proved that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium defense strategy is the best choice for the defender when there are different types of attackers.
引用
收藏
页数:12
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