CEO's Inside Debt and Dynamics of Capital Structure

被引：37

作者：

Brisker, Eric R. ^{[1
]}

Wang, Wei ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Akron, Akron, OH 44325 USA

[2] Cleveland State Univ, Monte Ahuja Coll Business, Cleveland, OH 44115 USA

来源：

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2017年 / 46卷 / 03期

关键词：

PANEL-DATA MODELS; FRACTIONAL DEPENDENT-VARIABLES; PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT; RISK; INCENTIVES; FIRM; DETERMINANTS; BEHAVIOR; POLICIES; MERGERS;

D O I：

10.1111/fima.12169

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Debt-type compensation (inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preferences between the chief executive officer (CEO) and shareholders and, in turn, affects capital structure decisions. An excessively risk-averse CEO tends to use less debt than the shareholders desire, reduce debt quickly when the firm is overlevered, but is reluctant to increase debt when the firm is underlevered. We find that higher CEO's inside debt ratio (i.e., inside debt as a percentage of total incentive compensation) is associated with lower firm leverage and faster (slower) leverage adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level for overlevered (underlevered) firms. The CEO's inside debt ratio most conducive to capital structure rebalancing is around 10% of the firm's market debt ratio.

引用

页码：655 / 685

页数：31

共 48 条

[1] RISK REDUCTION AS A MANAGERIAL MOTIVE FOR CONGLOMERATE MERGERS [J].