Experiment research on the evolution of cooperation and network game theory

被引:6
作者
Rong ZhiHai [1 ]
Xu XiongRui [1 ]
Wu Zhi-Xi [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Elect Sci & Technol China, Sch Comp Sci & Engn, Chengdu 611731, Peoples R China
[2] Lanzhou Univ, Inst Computat Phys & Complex Syst, Lanzhou 730000, Peoples R China
关键词
network reciprocity; direct reciprocity; game experiments; complex networks; TIT-FOR-TAT; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; SOCIAL NETWORKS; PROMOTE COOPERATION; EFFECTIVE CHOICE; EMERGENCE; DYNAMICS; PLAY; PUNISHMENT; EXTORTION;
D O I
10.1360/SSPMA-2019-0129
中图分类号
P1 [天文学];
学科分类号
0704 ;
摘要
Focusing on the mechanisms of the evolution and emergence of cooperative behavior, this paper reviews the recent development of direct reciprocity and network reciprocity from perspectives of both theoretical and experimental research based on two-player Prisoner's Dilemma and multi-player Public Goods games. Repeated interactions provide the necessary condition for the emergence of direct reciprocity. The zero-determinant strategy, which is a new theory in direct reciprocity, has been deeply investigated from both theory and experiment. The zero-determinant strategy is a kind of memory-one strategies, which can unilaterally determine the payoff relationship in repeated games and may provide a novel tool to explore human decision behavior. Investigations on networked game experiments revealed that dynamic networks can facilitate and maintain human cooperation, while the influence of static networks on cooperation remains controversial. Furthermore, it is summarized that networked game experiments provide an efficient approach to studying the formation mechanism of network structure and the emergence of cooperation in complex systems.
引用
收藏
页数:15
相关论文
共 88 条
[1]   Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods [J].
Adami, Christoph ;
Schossau, Jory ;
Hintze, Arend .
PHYSICS OF LIFE REVIEWS, 2016, 19 :1-26
[2]   Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything [J].
Adami, Christoph ;
Hintze, Arend .
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS, 2013, 4
[3]  
Akin E., 2015, Games, V6, P175, DOI [DOI 10.3390/G6030175, 10.3390/g6030175]
[4]   Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure [J].
Allen, Benjamin ;
Lippner, Gabor ;
Chen, Yu-Ting ;
Fotouhi, Babak ;
Momeni, Naghmeh ;
Yau, Shing-Tung ;
Nowak, Martin A. .
NATURE, 2017, 544 (7649) :227-+
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2006, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO
[6]   Social networks and cooperation in hunter-gatherers [J].
Apicella, Coren L. ;
Marlowe, Frank W. ;
Fowler, James H. ;
Christakis, Nicholas A. .
NATURE, 2012, 481 (7382) :497-U109
[7]   THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J].
AXELROD, R ;
HAMILTON, WD .
SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) :1390-1396
[8]   MORE EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J].
AXELROD, R .
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1980, 24 (03) :379-403
[9]   EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J].
AXELROD, R .
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1980, 24 (01) :3-25
[10]   Equal pay for all prisoners [J].
Boerlijst, MC ;
Nowak, MA ;
Sigmund, K .
AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1997, 104 (04) :303-305