Evolution of indirect reciprocity

被引:1657
作者
Nowak, MA
Sigmund, K
机构
[1] Univ Vienna, Fac Math, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
[2] IIASA, A-2631 Laxenburg, Austria
[3] Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1038/nature04131
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Natural selection is conventionally assumed to favour the strong and selfish who maximize their own resources at the expense of others. But many biological systems, and especially human societies, are organized around altruistic, cooperative interactions. How can natural selection promote unselfish behaviour? Various mechanisms have been proposed, and a rich analysis of indirect reciprocity has recently emerged: I help you and somebody else helps me. The evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity leads to reputation building, morality judgement and complex social interactions with ever-increasing cognitive demands.
引用
收藏
页码:1291 / 1298
页数:8
相关论文
共 87 条
  • [1] Alexander R. D., 1987, BIOL MORAL SYSTEMS
  • [2] [Anonymous], 1996, Narrow Roads of Gene Land
  • [3] Arrow Kenneth J., 1974, The limits of organization
  • [4] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
    AXELROD, R
    HAMILTON, WD
    [J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396
  • [5] Axelrod R, 2006, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO
  • [6] TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND SOCIAL-HISTORY
    BERG, J
    DICKHAUT, J
    MCCABE, K
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1995, 10 (01) : 122 - 142
  • [7] Binmore K, 1992, FUN GAMES TEXT GAME
  • [8] Binmore Ken G., 1994, Game theory and the social contract
  • [9] Bridging the trust gap in electronic markets: A strategic framework for empirical study
    Bolton, GE
    Katok, E
    Ockenfels, A
    [J]. APPLICATIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND E-COMMERCE RESEARCH, 2005, 92 : 195 - 216
  • [10] Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
    Bolton, GE
    Katok, E
    Ockenfels, A
    [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2005, 89 (08) : 1457 - 1468