Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling

被引:26
作者
Bederson, Benjamin B. [1 ]
Jin, Ginger Zhe [2 ,3 ]
Leslie, Phillip [4 ]
Quinn, Alexander J. [5 ]
Zou, Ben [6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, Dept Comp Sci, 2117D Hornbake Lib, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] Univ Maryland, Dept Econ, 3114 Tydings Hall, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] 1092 Nowita Pl, Venice, CA 90291 USA
[5] Purdue Univ, Sch Elect & Comp Engn, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[6] Michigan State Univ, Dept Econ, 110 Marshall Adams Hall, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/mic.20150178
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In 2011, Maricopa County adopted voluntary restaurant hygiene grade cards (A, B, C, D). Using inspection results between 2007 and 2013, we show that only 58 percent of the subsequent inspections led to online grade posting. Although the disclosure rate in general declines with inspection outcome, higher-quality A restaurants are less likely to disclose than lower-quality As. After examining potential explanations, we believe the observed pattern is best explained by a mixture of signaling and countersignaling: the better A restaurants use nondisclosure as a countersignal, while worse As and better Bs use disclosure to stand out from the other restaurants.
引用
收藏
页码:41 / 66
页数:26
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