Impact of quality decisions on information sharing with supplier encroachment

被引:5
作者
Hou, Rui [1 ]
Li, Weijian [1 ]
Lin, Xiaogang [1 ]
Zhao, You [1 ]
机构
[1] Guangdong Univ Technol, Sch Management, Guangzhou 510520, Guangdong, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Game theory; information sharing; quality decision; supplier encroachment; MANUFACTURER ENCROACHMENT; PRODUCT QUALITY; CHAIN; PRICE; COMPETITION; CHANNEL; INVENTORY; BENEFITS;
D O I
10.1051/ro/2021184
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This study examines a retailer's decision to share market demand information in a supply chain wherein a supplier sells a product with a certain level of quality to a retailer, who then resells it to the end consumer. It also considers whether a supplier should establish a direct selling channel by incurring a fixed entry cost to compete with the retail channel. Although conventional wisdom indicates that a retailer may voluntarily disclose information under ex-ante supplier encroachment, our results show how and why a retailer may share information with the supplier who encroaches on the retail market with a decision on quality. Specifically, our findings reveal that information sharing is beneficial to the retailer when the quality cost coefficient is low and entry cost is relatively low, even under encroachment by the supplier. Moreover, the retailer may prefer to disclose demand information to the supplier if the quality cost coefficient is low, even when the entry cost is high, under non-encroachment. Interestingly, we found that the supplier prefers to encroach if the retailer shares demand information when the entry cost is moderate. Further, we found that the retailer has a higher incentive to share information under supplier encroachment compared with non-encroachment. These results are in sharp contrast with the extant literature.
引用
收藏
页码:145 / 164
页数:20
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