Self-organized interdependence among populations promotes cooperation by means of coevolution

被引:43
作者
Chu, Chen [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Hu, Xintao [4 ,5 ]
Shen, Chen [1 ]
Li, Tong [4 ,5 ]
Boccaletti, Stefano [6 ,7 ]
Shi, Lei [1 ]
Wang, Zhen [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Stat & Math, Kunming 650221, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[2] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Mech Engn, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[3] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Ctr OPTical IMagery Anal & Learning OPTIMAL, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[4] Yunnan Univ, Sch Software, Kunming 650504, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[5] Key Lab Software Engn Yunnan Prov, Kunming 650091, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[6] CNR, Inst Complex Syst, Via Madonna del Piano 10, I-50019 Florence, Italy
[7] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Unmanned Syst Res Inst, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; DIVERSITY PROMOTES; EVOLUTION; NETWORKS; REPUTATION; GAMES;
D O I
10.1063/1.5059360
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
We show that self-organized interdependence promotes the evolution of cooperation in interdependent networks. The evolution of connections between networks occurs according to the following rule: if a player often wins against its opponent (regardless of its strategy), it is allowed to form an external link with the corresponding partner in another network to obtain additional benefit; otherwise, the opportunity to increase its benefit is lost. Through numerical simulation, it is unveiled that cooperation can be significantly promoted due to interdependent network reciprocity. Interestingly, the synchronization of evolutionary processes emerges on both networks, and individuals can take advantage of interdependent network reciprocity when both the strategies and the coevolving times in the two networks are synchronous. Published under license by AIP Publishing.
引用
收藏
页数:6
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