Efficient v.s. equilibrium unemployment with match-specific costs

被引：7
作者：
Cheron, A
机构：
[1] Univ Maine, GAINS, F-72085 Le Mans, France
[2] Fac Droit & Sci Econ, CEPREMAP, F-72085 Le Mans, France
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 88卷 / 02期
关键词：
hiring cost; hold-up; matching;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.007
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper extends the standard matching model by adding match-specific costs, which can only be partially protected from hold-up because of workers' bargaining power. We show that a decrease in equilibrium unemployment might improve welfare for realistic values of workers' bargaining power. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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页码：176 / 183
页数：8
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