Legislative Term Limits and Voter Turnout

被引:7
作者
Kuhlmann, Robynn [1 ]
Lewis, Daniel C. [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cent Missouri, Polit Sci, Warrensburg, MO USA
[2] Siena Coll, Polit Sci, Loudonville, NY USA
[3] Siena Coll, Community Policy Inst, Loudonville, NY USA
[4] Siena Coll, Interdisciplinary Res Methods Program, Loudonville, NY USA
关键词
term limits; legislative politics; political participation; political behavior; elections; legislative elections; voting behavior; STATE LEGISLATORS; STRATEGIC POLITICIANS; BALLOT INITIATIVES; DIRECT DEMOCRACY; PUBLIC SUPPORT; POLICY; IMPACT; PROFESSIONALIZATION; PARTICIPATION; CONSEQUENCES;
D O I
10.1177/1532440017718821
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
According to reformers, legislative term limits should increase voter turnout by enhancing electoral competitiveness for legislative seats. However, this claim has been largely untested. The only existing study of the effect of legislative term limits on voter turnout, to date, finds that turnout in California did not increase after the imposition of term limits and may have decreased turnout. Yet, it is unclear whether this result generalizes to other states. This study employs a comparative state analysis of both aggregate turnout and district-level turnout rates in state legislative elections. We find that term limits significantly increase voting rates in state legislative elections.
引用
收藏
页码:372 / 392
页数:21
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