A tug-of-war team contest

被引：14

作者：

Haefner, Samuel ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Basel, Fac Business & Econ, Peter Merian Weg 6, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2017年 / 104卷

关键词：

Team contests; Multi-stage contests; Tug-of-war; All-pay auction; Absorbing Markov chain; ALL-PAY AUCTION; RENT-SEEKING; ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS; PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM; HEAD STARTS; INFORMATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.013

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper analyzes a tug-of-war contest between two teams. In each round of the tug-of-war, a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all-pay auction with asymmetric value distributions and effort effectiveness. Whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of battle victories over the opponent wins the tug-of-war. There exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium in bidding strategies which depend on the respective player's valuation and the current state of the tug-of-war. We derive rich comparative statics for this equilibrium by using the fact that the state of the tug-of-war evolves according to a time-homogeneous absorbing Markov chain. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：372 / 391

页数：20

共 55 条

[1]

Agastya Murali., 2006, Continuing Wars of Attrition

[2] Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case [J].