Geometry of run-off elections

被引：1
作者：
Duddy, Conal [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Natl Univ Ireland Galway, JE Cairnes Sch Business & Econ, Univ Rd, Galway, Ireland
[2] Natl Univ Ireland Galway, Whitaker Inst, Univ Rd, Galway, Ireland
来源：
PUBLIC CHOICE | 2017年 / 173卷 / 3-4期
关键词：
Geometry; Voting; Monotonicity; Election triangle; MONOTONICITY; EFFICIENCY; PARADOXES;
D O I：
10.1007/s11127-017-0476-2
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We present a geometric representation of the method of run-off voting. With this representation we can observe the non-monotonicity of the method and its susceptibility to the no-show paradox. The geometry allows us easily to identify a novel compromise rule between run-off voting and plurality voting that is monotonic.
引用
收藏
页码：267 / 288
页数：22
相关论文
共 35 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], MATH MAGAZINE
  • [2] [Anonymous], WORKING PAPER
  • [3] [Anonymous], VOTING SIMULATION VI
  • [4] [Anonymous], ANN M PUBL CHOIC SOC
  • [5] [Anonymous], 1995, Basic geometry of voting, DOI DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-57748-2
  • [6] [Anonymous], 1992, MATH MAG
  • [7] [Anonymous], 1965, J R STAT SOC A
  • [8] [Anonymous], WORLD M PUBL CHOIC S
  • [9] Black D., 1958, The Theory of Committees and Elections
  • [10] Direct presidential elections: a world summary
    Blais, A
    Massicotte, L
    Dobrzynska, A
    [J]. ELECTORAL STUDIES, 1997, 16 (04) : 441 - 455
1234