Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions

被引:5
作者
Robson, AJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada
来源
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 1999年 / 32卷 / 01期
关键词
D O I
10.2307/136405
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:247 / 250
页数:4
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