Group Meeting Frequency and Borrowers' Repayment Performance in Microfinance: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment in South Africa

被引:9
作者
Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia [1 ,2 ]
De Michele, Angela [3 ]
Di Maio, Giorgio [4 ]
Landoni, Paolo [5 ]
Parravicini, Susanna [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Milano Bicocca Milano, Dept Econ Management & Stat DEMS, Milan, Italy
[2] Ctr European Res Microfinance CERMi, Brussels, Belgium
[3] Small Enterprise Fdn, Tzaneen, South Africa
[4] Univ Insubria, Dept Econ, Varese, Italy
[5] Politecn Torino, Dept Management & Prod Engn, Turin, Italy
关键词
microfinance; group lending; group meetings; quasi-natural experiment; repayment delay; savings; RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT; JOINT-LIABILITY; MICROCREDIT; IMPACTS; ECONOMICS; URBAN; BANK;
D O I
10.1093/jae/ejab004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A quasi-natural experiment has been carried out at The Small Enterprise Foundation, a South African microfinance institution offering group lending with joint liability. In a pilot project, the frequency of meetings was reduced from fortnightly to monthly and the members of the groups were no more required to attend all the meetings but they could send a representative. After selecting a suitable control group using propensity score matching techniques, we ran difference-in-difference regressions to evaluate the impact of the policy changes. Estimates suggest that the pilot project increased loan repayment delays and decreased groups' deposits, but it had a negligible impact on groups' savings balances. Text mining techniques, applied to survey data, pointed towards the lack of trust within the groups whose members did not meet frequently outside the repayment meetings as one of the causes of the negative outcomes of the pilot experiment. We conclude that group meetings are an effective tool to stimulate the accumulation of social capital among microcredit borrowers.
引用
收藏
页码:447 / 477
页数:31
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