Time pressure and honesty in a deception game

被引：53

作者：

Capraro, Valerio ^{[1
]}

Schulz, Jonathan ^{[2
]}

Rand, David G. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Middlesex Univ, Econ Dept, London NW4 4BT, England

[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Human Evolutionary Biol, 11 Divin Ave, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] MIT, Sloan Sch, 30 Mem Dr, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS | 2019年 / 79卷

关键词：

GENDER-DIFFERENCES; SOCIAL HEURISTICS; DECISION; REDUCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.socec.2019.01.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N = 1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.

引用

页码：93 / 99

页数：7

共 34 条

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