Resource allocation model based on non-cooperative bidding game in P2P network

被引:0
作者
Tao Jun [1 ]
Chen Hang [1 ]
Wu JiaGao
机构
[1] Southeast Univ, Sch Comp Sci & Engn, Nanjing 210096, Peoples R China
来源
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ADVANCES IN COMPUTER AND SENSOR NETWORKS AND SYSTEMS, PROCEEDINGS: IN CELEBRATION OF 60TH BIRTHDAY OF PROF. S. SITHARAMA IYENGAR FOR HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SCIENCE OF COMPUTING | 2008年
关键词
P2P behaviors; bidding game; resource allocation;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Game theory is applied to studying the P2P resource allocation technologies further in this paper The mechanism of P2P resource pricing, which shows the relation of supply and demand, was presented based on bidding. Subsequently, we designed the utility function of-end system and proved the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in P2P resource allocation, game. At last, we present a P2P resource allocation algorithm (PRANG) based on the resource allocation game model. The results of experiment and simulation show that PRANG algorithm can provide references for the quantity of resource that users demand and regularize the users.' bids. Consequently, the allocation of the whole P2P resource tends to be more reasonable.
引用
收藏
页码:352 / 358
页数:7
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