Asset markets with insider trading disclosure rule and reselling constraint: An experimental analysis

被引:1
作者
Halim, Edward [1 ]
Riyanto, Yohanes E. [2 ]
机构
[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Social Sci, Div Econ, 48 Nanyang Ave, Singapore 639818, Singapore
[2] Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Social Sci, Econ Programme, 48 Nanyang Ave,HSS 04-70, Singapore 639818, Singapore
关键词
Laboratory experiment; Asset market; Insider; Disclosure; Holding requirement; Asymmetric information; PRICE BUBBLES; RISK-AVERSION; INFORMATION; OVERCONFIDENCE; EXPECTATIONS; STOCK; PERFORMANCE; QUALITY; CRASHES; GENDER;
D O I
10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103745
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate the impact of compulsory insider-trading disclosure and its combination with a mandatory holding rule on price predictability and asset mispricing. We modify the dynamic price-adjustment model to account for insiders' private information. Our results show that insiders produce weakly-characterized price signals that induce a less than proportional price adjustment to the changes in the dividend value, in both markets with disclosure rule and holding requirement, in comparison with unregulated markets. A shift in insiders' strategies from information-motivated to liquidity-motivated trading appears to fuel the impairment of price predictability in regulated markets. The exacerbation of asset mispricing in markets with holding restriction is characterized by a growth in the speculative transactions and loss-making trading proposals. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页数:23
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