Durable goods and conformity

被引:11
作者
House, Christopher L. [1 ,2 ]
Ozdenoren, Emre [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00022.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A consumer's demand for a durable good is governed not only by his individual preferences but also by preferences of other market participants. This interdependence of preferences arises from the inevitable resale of durable goods. If most people prefer goods with certain features, original buyers conform and choose goods with these features even if they do not like them. Using a matching model, we show there is always conformity in equilibrium. The incentive to conform is strongest for long-lived durables and for people who trade frequently. If average preferences are sufficiently strong, there is always too little conformity in equilibrium.
引用
收藏
页码:452 / 468
页数:17
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