Separated interactive behaviors promote cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

被引:5
作者
Mao, Deming [1 ]
Li, Xiaoyu [1 ]
Mu, Dejun [1 ]
Liu, Dujuan [3 ]
Chu, Chen [2 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Cybersecur, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Ctr Opt IMagery Anal & Learning OPTIMAL, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[3] Xian Aeronaut Polytech Inst, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[4] Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Stat & Math, Kunming 650221, Yunnan, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
EVOLUTION; COEVOLUTION; NETWORKS;
D O I
10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00118-7
中图分类号
O469 [凝聚态物理学];
学科分类号
070205 ;
摘要
Interactive diversity and interactive identity are two common behavioral patterns. Interactive identity, where each individual takes identity behavior to all its neighbors, and interactive diversity, where each individual takes diversity behaviors to its different neighbors. However, most previous researches mainly focused on study these two behaviors separately. So how the cooperation dynamics will perform when two behaviors are mixed in population still needs a reasonable explanation. In this paper, we study the cooperation evolution process when players take interactive diversity and identity are mixed in population. This model is applied for prisoner dilemma game on square lattice. When studying mixed population including both interactive in various proportions we find out the damage of cooperation. On the contrary, when player taking interactive diversity or players taking interactive identity exist alone in the population cooperation will be improved. To figure out the internal dynamic, we plot different kinds of strategy pair evolution process and the distribution of strategy and player when different proportion. The results of our study reveal that for only players taking interactive diversity or identity, defectors form distinct shape of clusters, while when two typed players are mixed distribute in network, defectors will form large and connected clusters, which is the crucial to maintain existence of defectors.
引用
收藏
页数:9
相关论文
共 47 条
[1]   Social influence preserves cooperative strategies in the conditional cooperator public goods game on a multiplex network [J].
Allen, James M. ;
Skeldon, Anne C. ;
Hoyle, Rebecca B. .
PHYSICAL REVIEW E, 2018, 98 (06)
[2]   Evolutionary dynamics of higher-order interactions in social networks [J].
Alvarez-Rodriguez, Unai ;
Battiston, Federico ;
de Arruda, Guilherme Ferraz ;
Moreno, Yamir ;
Perc, Matjaz ;
Latora, Vito .
NATURE HUMAN BEHAVIOUR, 2021, 5 (05) :586-595
[3]   THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J].
AXELROD, R ;
HAMILTON, WD .
SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) :1390-1396
[4]   Complex networks: Structure and dynamics [J].
Boccaletti, S. ;
Latora, V. ;
Moreno, Y. ;
Chavez, M. ;
Hwang, D. -U. .
PHYSICS REPORTS-REVIEW SECTION OF PHYSICS LETTERS, 2006, 424 (4-5) :175-308
[5]   Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment [J].
Chen, Xiaojie ;
Szolnoki, Attila ;
Perc, Matjaz .
NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS, 2014, 16
[6]   Aspiration-based coevolution of node weights promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game [J].
Chu, Chen ;
Mu, Chunjiang ;
Liu, Jinzhuo ;
Liu, Chen ;
Boccaletti, Stefano ;
Shi, Lei ;
Wang, Zhen .
NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS, 2019, 21 (06)
[7]   Self-organized interdependence among populations promotes cooperation by means of coevolution [J].
Chu, Chen ;
Hu, Xintao ;
Shen, Chen ;
Li, Tong ;
Boccaletti, Stefano ;
Shi, Lei ;
Wang, Zhen .
CHAOS, 2019, 29 (01)
[8]   Discontinuous Transitions and Rhythmic States in the D-Dimensional Kuramoto Model Induced by a Positive Feedback with the Global Order Parameter [J].
Dai, X. ;
Li, X. ;
Guo, H. ;
Jia, D. ;
Perc, M. ;
Manshour, P. ;
Wang, Z. ;
Boccaletti, S. .
PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS, 2020, 125 (19)
[9]  
Darwin C, 1877, The different forms of flowers on plants of the same species
[10]  
Fang Y., 2019, SCI REP-UK, V9, P1, DOI DOI 10.1038/S41598