Coordinating a supply chain for deteriorating items with multi-factor-dependent demand over a finite planning horizon

被引:27
作者
Bai, Qingguo [1 ,2 ]
Xu, Xianhao [1 ]
Xu, Jianteng [2 ]
Wang, Dong [3 ]
机构
[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430074, Hubei, Peoples R China
[2] Qufu Normal Univ, Sch Management, Rizhao 276826, Shandong, Peoples R China
[3] Swansea Univ, Coll Engn, Singleton Pk, Swansea SA2 8PP, W Glam, Wales
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Deteriorating item; Multi-factor-dependent demand; Revenue-sharing; Stackelberg game; Supply chain coordination; PRODUCTION-INVENTORY MODEL; VENDOR-MANAGED INVENTORY; REVENUE-SHARING CONTRACTS; CHANNEL COORDINATION; PRODUCT; STOCK; PRICE; INVESTMENT; QUALITY; POLICY;
D O I
10.1016/j.apm.2016.06.021
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
This study considers a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain for deteriorating items over a finite planning horizon. In the case with multi-factor-dependent demand, we analyze the coordination of the system within a contract mechanism. First, we formulate and then compare a decentralized model and a centralized model. Next, we propose a revenue-sharing contract and a revised revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. We illustrate the proposed models with a numerical example and we perform sensitivity analysis of the coordination results based on several key parameters. The results show that the supply chain's profit in the centralized system increases by at least 1/3, where both contracts can coordinate the system and the fraction parameter of the revenue exists when each contract is acceptable to both members of the supply chain, and the revised revenue-sharing contract always yields a higher profit than the revenue sharing contract. Furthermore, the supply chain's profit under the revised revenue-sharing contract is shown to be equivalent to that with the centralized system. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:9342 / 9361
页数:20
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