Optimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games

被引：114
作者：
Battalio, R [1 ]
Samuelson, L
Van Huyck, J
机构：
[1] Texas A&M Univ, Dept Econ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
[2] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA
来源：
ECONOMETRICA | 2001年 / 69卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1111/1468-0262.00212
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：749 / 764
页数：16
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