Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and weaknesses

被引:13
作者
Feng, Yan [1 ]
Kristensen, Soren Rud [2 ]
Lorgelly, Paula [3 ,4 ]
Meacock, Rachel [5 ]
Sanchez, Marina Rodes [3 ]
Sicilian, Luigi [6 ]
Sutton, Matt [5 ]
机构
[1] Queen Mary Univ London, Barts & London Sch Med & Dent, Ctr Primary Care & Publ Hlth, London E1 2AB, England
[2] Imperial Coll London, Inst Global Hlth Innovat, Ctr Hlth Policy, London SW7 2A, England
[3] Off Hlth Econ, London SW1E 6QT, England
[4] Kings Coll London, Fac Life Sci & Med, London WC2R 2LS, England
[5] Univ Manchester, Sch Hlth Sci, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
[6] Univ York, Dept Econ & Related Studies, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England
基金
美国国家卫生研究院;
关键词
Pay-for-Performance; Specialised care; National Health Service; Financial incentives; Health Policy; QUALITY-OF-CARE; HEALTH-CARE; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; IMPROVE QUALITY; PAYMENT; PROGRAMS; SCHEMES; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1016/j.healthpol.2019.07.007
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
Pay-for-Performance (P4P) schemes have become increasingly common internationally, yet evidence of their effectiveness remains ambiguous. P4P has been widely used in England for over a decade both in primary and secondary care. A prominent P4P programme in secondary care is the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework. The most recent addition to this framework is Prescribed Specialised Services (PSS) CQUIN, introduced into the NHS in England in 2013. This study offers a review and critique of the PSS CQUIN scheme for specialised care. A key feature of PSS CQUIN is that whilst it is centrally developed, performance targets are agreed locally. This means that there is variation across providers in the schemes selected from the national menu, the achievement level needed to earn payment, and the proportion of the overall payment attached to each scheme. Specific schemes vary in terms of what is incentivised - structure, process and/or outcome - and how they are incentivised. Centralised versus decentralised decision making, the nature of the performance measures, the tiered payment structure and the dynamic nature of the schemes have created a sophisticated but complex P4P programme which requires evaluation to understand the effect of such incentives on specialised care. (C) 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:1036 / 1041
页数:6
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