Models of Clientelism and Policy Change: The Case of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes in Mexico and Brazil

被引：16
作者：
Ansell, Aaron [1 ]
Mitchell, Ken [1 ]
机构：
[1] Monmouth Univ, W Long Branch, NJ 07764 USA
来源：
BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH | 2011年 / 30卷 / 03期
关键词：
clientelism; conditional cash cransfers; social development; Mexico; Brazil; POLITICAL CLIENTELISM;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1470-9856.2010.00497.x
中图分类号：
K9 [地理];
学科分类号：
0705 ;
摘要：
Clientelist systems vary, and this variation influences the adoption and evolution of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes. We find that vertically integrated, corporatist clientelism in Mexico and more locally oriented, bossist clientelism in Brazil differentially shape the choices of governments to turn piecemeal, discretionary CCTs into more expansive and secure benefits.
引用
收藏
页码：298 / 312
页数：15
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