Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime

被引：4

作者：

Jordan, Jerry L. ^{[1
]}

Luther, William J. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Pacific Acad Adv Studies, 1831 Amber Lane, Burbank, CA 91504 USA

[2] Florida Atlantic Univ, Dept Econ, Boca Raton, FL 33431 USA

来源：

QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE | 2022年 / 84卷

关键词：

Central bank; Central bank independence; Federal Reserve; Monetary policy; Political economy; LEVEL ECONOMIC-CONDITIONS; MONETARY-POLICY; SYSTEM; INPUTS; OVERSIGHT; PATROLS; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.qref.2020.10.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The Federal Reserve is exposed to a greater degree of political influence under its new operating regime. We survey the relevant literature and describe the Fed's new operating regime. Then we explain how the regime change reduced de facto central bank independence. In brief, the regime change increased the appointment power of the President and improved the bargaining power of Congress. We offer some suggestions for bolstering de facto independence at the Fed. (C) 2020 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：510 / 515

页数：6

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