Approximate Nash Equilibria in Large Nonconvex Aggregative Games

被引:4
作者
Liu, Kang [1 ,2 ]
Oudjane, Nadia [3 ,4 ]
Wan, Cheng [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Ecole Polytech, Ctr Math Appl, F-91128 Palaiseau, France
[2] Inria Saclay Ctr, F-91120 Palaiseau, France
[3] EDF Lab Paris Saclay, Res & Dev, F-91120 Palaiseau, France
[4] Finance Energy Market Res Ctr, Palaiseau, France
关键词
Shapley-Folkman lemma; sum-aggregative games; nonconvex game; large finite game; epsilon-Nash equilibrium; gradient-proximal algorithm; congestion game; DUALITY GAP; OPTIMIZATION;
D O I
10.1287/moor.2022.1321
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper shows the existence of O(1/n(gamma))-Nash equilibria in n-player noncooperative sum-aggregative games in which the players' cost functions, depending only on their own action and the average of all players' actions, are lower semicontinuous in the former, whereas gamma-Holder continuous in the latter. Neither the action sets nor the cost functions need to be convex. For an important class of sum-aggregative games, which includes congestion games with gamma equal to one, a gradient-proximal algorithm is used to construct O(1/n)-Nash equilibria with at most O(n(3)) iterations. These results are applied to a numerical example concerning the demand-side management of an electricity system. The asymptotic performance of the algorithm when n tends to infinity is illustrated.
引用
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页码:1791 / 1809
页数:19
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