DOES A MANDATORY TELEMEDICINE CALL PRIOR TO VISITING A PHYSICIAN REDUCE COSTS OR SIMPLY ATTRACT GOOD RISKS?

被引:11
作者
Grandchamp, Chantal [1 ]
Gardiol, Lucien [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lausanne, IEMS, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
关键词
health; insurance; selection; efficiency; telemedicine; HEALTH-INSURANCE; CARE; DEMAND; EXPENDITURE;
D O I
10.1002/hec.1668
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper aims to estimate empirically the efficiency of a Swiss telemedicine service introduced in 2003. We used claims' data gathered by a major Swiss health insurer, over a period of 6 years and involving 160 000 insured adults. In Switzerland, health insurance is mandatory, but everyone has the option of choosing between a managed care plan and a fee-for-service plan. This paper focuses on a conventional fee-for-service plan including a mandatory access to a telemedicine service; the insured are obliged to phone this medical call centre before visiting a physician. This type of plan generates much lower average health expenditures than a conventional insurance plan. Reasons for this may include selection, incentive effects or efficiency. In our sample, about 90% of the difference in health expenditure can be explained by selection and incentive effects. The remaining 10% of savings due to the efficiency of the telemedicine service amount to about SFr 150 per year per insured, of which approximately 60% is saved by the insurer and 40% by the insured. Although the efficiency effect is greater than the cost of the plan, the big winners are the insured who not only save monetary and non-monetary costs but also benefit from reduced premiums. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:1257 / 1267
页数:11
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