Death by committee? An analysis of corporate board (sub-) committees *

被引:21
作者
Adams, Renee B. [1 ,2 ]
Ragunathan, Vanitha [3 ]
Tumarkin, Robert [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Oxford OX1 1HP, England
[2] Royal Acad Belgium, ECGI, 1 Rue Ducale,Hertogsstr, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
[3] Univ Queensland, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia
[4] UNSW Australia, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
基金
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词
Board of directors; Committee; Decision-making; Sarbanes-Oxley; GROUP DECISION-MAKING; INSIDER TRADES; PANEL-DATA; PERFORMANCE; RETURNS; COSTS; SIZE; DETERMINANTS; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.032
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Theoretical models of groups suggest that sub-group usage can affect communication among members and group decision-making. To examine the trade-offs from forming subgroups, we assemble a detailed dataset on corporate boards (groups) and committees (subgroups). Boards have increasingly used committees formally staffed entirely by outside directors. Our data show that twenty-five percent of all director meetings occurred in such committees in 1996; this increased to 45% by 2010. Our evidence suggests that granting formal authority to such committees can impair communication and decision-making. Subgroups are relatively understudied, but our results suggest that they play an important role in group functioning and corporate governance. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1119 / 1146
页数:28
相关论文
共 94 条