Do Economists Swing for the Fences after Tenure?

被引:31
作者
Brogaard, Jonathan [1 ]
Engelberg, Joseph [2 ]
Van Wesep, Edward [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Washington, Foster Sch Business, Finance, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
[2] Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, Finance & Accounting, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[3] Univ Colorado, Leeds Sch Business, Finance, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
关键词
OR-OUT CONTRACTS; ACADEMIC TENURE; PRODUCTIVITY;
D O I
10.1257/jep.32.1.179
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using a sample of all academics who pass through top 50 economics and finance departments from 1996 through 2014, we study whether the granting of tenure leads faculty to pursue riskier ideas. We use the extreme tails of ex-post citations as our measure of risk and find that both the number of publications and the portion consisting of "home runs" peak at tenure and fall steadily for a decade thereafter. Similar patterns hold for faculty at elite (top 10) institutions and for faculty who take differing time to tenure. We find the opposite pattern among poorly cited publications: their numbers rise post-tenure.
引用
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页码:179 / 194
页数:16
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