Income tax buyouts and income tax evasion

被引:2
作者
Goerke, Laszlo [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Trier, Inst Labour Law & Ind Relat European Union IAAEU, D-54286 Trier, Germany
[2] IZA, Bonn, Germany
[3] CESifo, Munich, Germany
关键词
Asymmetric information; Revenues; Self-selection; Tax buyouts; Tax evasion; PENALTY SCHEMES;
D O I
10.1007/s10797-013-9302-z
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A tax buyout is a contract between tax authorities and a tax payer which reduces the marginal income tax rate in exchange for a lump-sum payment. While previous contributions have focussed on labour supply, we consider the interaction with tax evasion and show that a buyout can increase expected tax revenues. This will be the case if (1) the audit probability is constant and the penalty for evasion is a function of undeclared income or (2) the penalty depends on the amount of taxes evaded, and authorities use information about income generated by the decision about a tax buyout offer when setting audit probabilities. Since individuals will only utilise a tax buyout if they are better off, higher tax revenues imply that such contracts can be Pareto improving.
引用
收藏
页码:120 / 143
页数:24
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