A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

被引：6
|
作者：
Karos, Dominik [1 ]
Muto, Nozomu [2 ]
Rachmilevitch, Shiran [3 ]
机构：
[1] Maastricht Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Maastricht, Netherlands
[2] Yokohama Natl Univ, Dept Econ, Yokohama, Kanagawa, Japan
[3] Univ Haifa, Dept Econ, Haifa, Israel
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2018年 / 47卷 / 04期
关键词：
Bargaining; Efficiency-free characterizations; Parametrized solutions; C71; C78; NASH;
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players' ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.
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页码：1169 / 1182
页数：14
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