On political morality and is objectivity in Dworkin

Dworkin chose the middle road between the philosophy of natural law, with all the difficulties of this viewpoint, and legal positivism and other directions that deny the necessary connection between law and morality. His theory of law as integrity, consistently developed during three decades, is challenging and fruitful for discussion. its attraction lies in the understanding of law as something greater than a system of rules, law being the attitude of judges as well as of citizens who put principles ahead of legal practice in order to determine the best direction into the future and to have the best connection with the past, showing thus that we live in a brotherhood regardless of our different interests and persuasions. However, such an indirect or "middle" viewpoint suffers numerous objections. From the position of positivism and formalism objections are raised about the vagueness of both types of integrity of the law, together with other theoretical inferences, e.g. the problem of the criteria for choosing moral principles in judging difficult cases, the questionable concept of legal practice in general, the obscurity of standards in selecting decisions aimed at improving the community in general etc. From the side of natural law, however, there have been complaints about the lack of a deeper foundedness and generality of moral principles and their connection to law.