Dynamics of Data Delivery in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks: A Bargaining Game Approach

In this paper, we address the problem of dynamic packet forwarding with a set of wireless autonomous ad hoc network nodes, where each node acting in a selfish manner tries to use the resources of other nodes. We model the dynamic packet forwarding problem as a modified Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game. In our model, a mobile node (player) negotiates with the other mobile node to obtain an agreeable and respectable sharing rule of packet forwarding based on its own resource available, such that a node should not agree to forward packets without the energy or storage capacity to do so. We investigate and solve this bargaining by finding the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) strategies of the game. We consider finite horizon of the bargaining game and examine its SPNE. The solution obtained from bargaining ensures that a mobile device always finds a peer to help forward packets in order to keep the network at flow. Extensive simulations using OMNET++ simulation frameworks are conducted to evaluate how the level of participation of each mobile node impact the network overall performance. Simulation results show that our proposed bargaining game scheme performs better than other resource shared algorithms, namely the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) and the bargaining game based access network selection for heterogeneous network.