Shareholder litigation rights and the cost of debt: Evidence from derivative lawsuits

被引：83
|
作者：
Ni, Xiaoran [1 ,2 ]
Yin, Sirui [3 ]
机构：
[1] Xiamen Univ, Dept Finance, Sch Econ, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
[2] Xiamen Univ, Wang Yanan Inst Studies Econ WISE, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Arizona, Eller Coll Management, Dept Finance, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2018年 / 48卷
关键词：
Shareholder litigation right; Universal demand law; Cost of debt; Corporate governance; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; PROPENSITY SCORE; AGENCY COSTS; RISK-TAKING; FINANCE; RESPONSES; BOARDS; MARKET; CAUSAL;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.008
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Exploiting the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as exogenous shocks to filing derivative lawsuits, we find that weakened shareholder litigation rights cause a significant increase in the cost of debt. Deteriorated corporate governance, increased information asymmetry, and heightened managerial risk-taking are the underlying channels. Shareholders respond to weakened litigation rights by providing managers with less risk-taking incentives. Overall, our findings suggest that the shareholder litigation rights are important to debtholders. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：169 / 186
页数：18
相关论文
共 50 条
12345