Free will, causation, and Sartorio's Causation and Free Will

被引:0
作者
Anic, Zvonimir [1 ]
Pecnjak, Davor [1 ]
机构
[1] Inst Philosophy, Ul Grada Vukovara 54, HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia
来源
PROLEGOMENA | 2020年 / 19卷 / 01期
关键词
Free will; causation; omissions; causal history; causal powers;
D O I
10.26362/20200105
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
No matter what side one takes in the debate about free will, one will also have to accept certain metaphysical assumptions about causation and causal laws and, consequently, posit a certain ontological framework. In Causation and Free Will, Sartorio develops a compatibilist, actual causal sequence account of free will which is grounded on certain controversial features that causation presumably has. In this paper, we argue that those features cannot be jointly incorporated adequately into any plausible philosophical account of causation regardless of the validity of the thesis of causal determinism, and that they work against one another in Sartorio's account of free will. We argue that no philosophical account of free will can establish the freedom of the will without offering a plausible answer of how an agent can have a grip on causation.
引用
收藏
页码:77 / 90
页数:14
相关论文
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